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I. Introduction
A large part of the rural landscape of developing countries is dominated by
subsistence farmers, operating on small or marginal plots of land. In the absence
of insurance markets, they take recourse to a number of coping strategies to
protect themselves from various risks. Some engage in specialization that involves
adoptionof production techniques that are resistant to pests, droughts, and other
environmental risk factors. For instance, pearl millet, an extremely sturdy cereal
grown in sub-Saharan Africa, is known for adapting well to extreme evapo-
transpiration, poor sandy soils, and erratic rains. Others resort to consumption
smoothing via diversiﬁcation, some of which involves combining farm and off-
farm activities within the same household.
The tendency of consumption-smoothing choices to either lift or further
entrap small farmers into poverty has long intrigued economists, and proliﬁc
sets of literature have developed in several different analytical directions. On
the one hand, stylized poverty trap models have focused on the tendency of
asset-poor and hence risk-averse households residing close to the poverty
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threshold to opt for low-risk, low-return portfolios that presumably lower the
risk of hunger but paradoxically push them down a spiral of even further
destitution ðDercon 1998, 2005; Carter and Barrett 2006; Barrett, Carter, and
Ikegami 2008Þ. The main focus of this literature is on the choice between safer,
although low return ðsubsistenceÞ, cropping activities and riskier, although
higher return, livestock and cash crop production. On the other hand, portfolio
diversiﬁcation into nonfarm ðe.g., off-farm laborÞ sources of income is typically
seen as a strategy that stochastically dominates those relying on own-farm
income alone ðBarrett, Bezuneh, and Aboud 2001Þ.
Indeed, the relatively more scarce literature on consumption smoothing via
nonfarm employment agrees that the off-farm labor supply in poor rural set-
tings tends to increase in the event of a shock, thus potentially providing a vi-
able insurance in uncertain environments ðKochar 1999; Rose 2001; Cam-
eron and Worswick 2003Þ. While the central question here is whether—on
average—a well-functioning rural market can serve as a poverty-alleviating
escape option for farmers struck by idiosyncratic shocks, some of the broader
literature on off-farm ðand in particular nonagriculturalÞ labor voices a con-
cern over distributional issues and asks the question whether labor market
barriers may preclude poorer farmers from effectively smoothing their con-
sumption in a risky environment ðLeones and Feldman 1998; van den Berg
and Ruben 2001Þ. The underlying policy implication is that removal of bar-
riers to entry in the off-farm market should help with assuring frictionless con-
sumption smoothing in rural environments fraught with uncertainty.
But is even a barrier-free factor market a panacea, and are those endowed
with better ex ante control over resources always “the winners”? To the best of
our knowledge, while the broader literature on off-farm labor considers dis-
tributional issues primarily on account of barriers to entry in the labor market,
studies looking at consumption smoothing via off-farm labor supply focus ex-
clusively on the effect of idiosyncratic shocks, possibly on account of the rea-
sonable ðand evidence backedÞ assumption that correlated shocks make per-
fect insurance impossible. This leaves out of focus the more intriguing case of
correlated shocks that affect both poor and rich farmers simultaneously and its
interesting general equilibrium dynamics, alongside situations in which obvi-
ous entry barriers to the off-farm labor market may not be present.
We contribute to the literature by ﬁrst modeling theoretically the ex ante
choices of farmers belonging to different portions of the asset distribution
among relatively risk-free subsistence cropping, riskier although higher return
cash cropping, and off-farm labor supply and consider the differential off-farm
labor supply effect of correlated shocks on both smaller and larger farmers in
a general equilibrium setting. We test some of the central predictions of the
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model with the use of data from the particularly interesting context of rural
Malawi, characterized by dualistic agricultural structure, including large cash
crop ðmainly tobacco and groundnutÞ producing estates, alongside a vast small-
holder sector, inhabited by predominantly subsistence farmers. Structural re-
forms in the 1990s attempted to dismantle the dualistic structure—a heritage of
active 1970s–1990s government support for the development of the cash crop
estate sector—by encouraging smallholder involvement in the production of
exportable cash crops, like tobacco, groundnuts, and cotton. However, there is
evidence supporting the persistence of the dualistic agricultural system in Ma-
lawi ðHarishima 2008Þ.
One of the most interesting and controversial phenomena in Malawi, con-
sistent with the existence of a dualistic agricultural sector, is ganyu—low-skill
off-farm labor, traditionally described as either a form of exploitation of the
poor by the rich ðBryceson 2006Þ or a low-risk and low-return diversiﬁcation
strategy of poor subsistence farmers, which eventually drives them further into
poverty ðWhiteside 2000Þ. If ganyu is indeed a poverty-entrapping strategy, we
should see it prevail in times of need and primarily among poor households.
However, data from the Second Integrated Survey of Malawi, collected by the
Malawi government ð2004Þ, indicate that more than half of all rural house-
holds offer ganyu, and ganyu supply is spread across households and seasons.
Furthermore, qualitative research indicates that ganyu may not be a result of
subsistence constraints but may represent an important source of additional
income ðOrr, Mwale, and Saiti-Chitsonga 2009Þ. This indicates that ganyu
may be more complex than a simple survival ðin fact, poverty enhancingÞ
strategy of smallholders, bound by small land size, credit constraints, and labor
and fertilizer shortages ðAlwang and Siegel 1999; Orr 2000; Orr and Mwale
2001; Harrigan 2003Þ. Testing the predictions of our model in the context of
Malawi not only helps us throw fresh light on the controversial phenomenon
of ganyu labor but also leads to more general and apparently counterintui-
tive ﬁndings that challenge some stylized perceptions of the broader literature
on portfolio diversiﬁcation in developing countries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The theoretical model is out-
lined in Section II. Section III discusses some relevant characteristics of rural
Malawi and presents some descriptive statistics. Section IV discusses the em-
pirical speciﬁcation, and Section V presents the econometric estimation strat-
egy and our empirical results. Section VI concludes.
II. The Ganyu Market: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
We consider a two-step cultivation process. In period 1 the farmer has to pre-
pare the ﬁeld, and in period 2 the farmer realizes the value from cultivation.
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When preparing the ﬁeld in period 1, the farmer has to use labor, and this
labor requirement is determined by the decision taken by the farmer about the
type of crop to produce in period 2 and the amount of land she has. We
distinguish between two types of crops—a ðsafeÞ staple crop, denoted S, and
the more risky commercial crop, denoted M. While the commercial crop
cannot be consumed directly, it can be sold in the market, generating pur-
chasing power for the farmer who can then buy subsistence goods from the
market. Thus, while the staple provides direct subsistence, the commercial crop
provides subsistence through a market exchange of the crop.
The other important element in our model is the timing of the realization
of the risk. While the uncertainty regarding the commercial crop is not re-
solved in period 1, when farmers decide on the period 1 investment in land,
the uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of period 2, or before the pro-
duction of the commercial crop happens. In other words, once the uncertainty
is resolved, the farmer has a choice of continuing with production or aban-
doning it and offering to be hired out in the labor market ðbecoming a ganyu
laborerÞ rather than working on her own farm. In what follows, we examine
ð1Þ the production of the staple crop, ð2Þ the production of the commercial
crop, and ð3Þ ganyu demand and supply in the aggregated economy.
A. Production of Staple Crop
Consider a farmer with T units of land and F units of family labor. There are
two periods in the production process. In the ﬁrst period, the land has to be
prepared for production of the crop in period 2. Preparing the land uses l S
units of labor per unit of land. Thus, the total amount of labor used on T
units of land in the ﬁrst period is LS1 5 l
ST . Given that the land has been pre-
pared, the second-period output of the staple crop S is given by the function
S LS2; T
 
5 LS2
 
aT 12a: ð1Þ
We normalize the price of the staple crop to be 1. If the land has been
prepared in period 1 for the staple crop, then in the second period the farmer has
to choose the optimal amount of labor to maximize the net value of the staple
crop. Thus, the farmer chooses LS2 to maximize ðLS2ÞaT 12a 2 w2LS2, where w2
is the wage rate in period 2. From the ﬁrst-order condition, it is easy to show
that the net income from the staple is maximized at
LS2 5 T
a
w2
 1= 12að Þ
: ð2Þ
While the farmer knows what the wage in period 2 is when deciding to use
labor in period 2, this wage is outside her control, and, hence, she takes it as
364 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E
given. The period 2 wage can take two possible values, wH and wL, with wH >
wL > 0. Obviously from ð2Þ, for this farmer, the period 2 labor used will be
higher when the corresponding wage is lower.
The labor used on one’s land can be a mix of hired and family labor. Family
labor can work on the farm or hire itself out at the market wage. The oppor-
tunity cost of family labor is, therefore, the market wage. We make the as-
sumption that a farmer exhausts family labor before hiring labor if the op-
portunity cost of the family labor is the same as the cost of hired labor.
The proﬁt, or in our case the rent from land, is the net value of the staple
crop—revenue minus the labor cost. Both the revenue and the labor cost are a
mix of market and imputed values. The crop can be consumed at home or
sold, and the market price ðwhich is 1 as assumedÞ is the opportunity cost of a
unit of home consumption. Moreover, as mentioned above, the cost of family
labor is the forgone wage in the ganyumarket. Suppose the high-wage state and
low-wage state are denoted H and L, respectively, and their respective prob-
abilities of happening are p and 1 2 p, with 0 < p < 1. Then, if i denotes the
state ði 5 H, LÞ, the period 2 net income from the staple crop using equation
ð2Þ is
Y Si 5 12 að ÞT
a
wi2
 a= 12að Þ
: ð3Þ
Finally, note two things. First, in period 1, there is no cash inﬂow from family
labor on one’s own farm but a cash outﬂow for hired labor. For simplicity, we
will assume that the farmer has enough liquidity to pay for hired labor in pe-
riod 1. This is consistent with our assumption that family labor is preferred to
hired labor. Also note that the labor demand for preparing the land in period 1
is an increasing function of land. Therefore, it is only the large farmers who
will hire labor in period 1; our assumption simply states that larger farmers
have enough liquidity. Second, since we are calculating the net income in pe-
riod 2, the family labor component always gets “paid” ði.e., is subtracted as
other wage-related costÞ. To compensate for this, the second-period income is
the net income plus the wages of family labor.
When the farmer decides to grow the staple on her land, she expects to earn
over the two periods a value given by
EY S 5 w1 F 2 l STð Þ1 p wH2 F 1 Y SH
 
1 12 pð Þ wL2F 1 Y SL
 
: ð4Þ
For ease in notation, let us deﬁne the following terms:
jH ; 12 að Þ a
wH2
 a= 12að Þ
;
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and
jL ; 12 að Þ a
wL2
 a= 12að Þ
:
Using these deﬁnitions, we can write ð4Þ as
EY S 5 w1 F 2 l STð Þ1 p wH2 F 1 jHT
 
1 12 pð Þ wL2F 1 jLT
 
: ð4Þ
For completeness, we need to make one more observation. An obvious al-
ternative for the farmer is not to produce any crop on the land and earn labor
income only in the two periods equal to w1F 1 p½wH2 F 1 ð12 pÞ½wL2F . Ob-
serve that ð4Þ collapses to this value for all landless laborers in the village ðT5
0Þ. We would want to be able to say that owning land is always at least as good
as not owning land and, hence,
EY S ≥ w1F 1 p wH2 F
 
1 12 pð Þ wL2F
 
for all T ≥ 0:
ð5Þ
B. Production of Commercial Crop
There are two major differences between the staple crop and the commercial
crop. First, the commercial crop technology is more sophisticated than the
staple crop technology. We assume that this is observed in the preparation of
the land. More speciﬁcally, for a given plot of land, the greater the intensity of
labor use on the land in period 1, the greater the productivity in period 2.
Preparation of the land can be interpreted as investment in land. For the staple
crop, this is a simple technology for which the investment in labor required per
unit of land is constant. For the commercial crop, greater investment can give
greater second-period productivity. There is, therefore, a period 1 output that
is nontransferable and has no immediate monetary value but has a positive
impact on the period 2 output. Formally, this productivity is denoted I, and
I 5 aT LM1
 g
; a > 0 and 0 < g < 1: ð6Þ
Recall that the productivity of the period 2 staple land has also been implicitly
deﬁned. For the staple crop, this productivity is an indicator function taking
the values 1 or 0. Any labor intensity less than l S gives zero productivity; any-
thing above l S gives a productivity of 1.
The second way in which the commercial crop differs from the staple crop
is the uncertainty of the activity. As stated above, the commercial crop can be
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hit by a shock such as droughts, ﬂoods, or crop disease. To keepmatters simple,
we add some structure to this shock, but as will be evident the qualitative results
will be unaffected by greater generalizations.
The risk of a shock, denoted ~A, generates two possible states: high return
ð ~A5 A > 1Þ or zero return ðcrop failureÞ. Risk ~A5 A with probability p, and
~A5 0 with probability 12p. The important thing about this risk is that
farmers in the beginning of period 2 can observe a perfect signal about what
the state will be. What this implies is that on receiving the signal about the low
state, the farmers have to abandon their decision to produce the commercial
crop. This means that their entire family must enter the labor market, as their
earnings from commercial crop production are zero and they cannot produce
any staple because they have not prepared their land for staple production.
For the positive situation of ~A5 A, the commercial crop production value
for the farmer is given by
M LM2 ; T
 
5 IA LM2
 
bT 12b; with 1 > g1 b; ð7Þ
and this happens with probability p. The restriction on g1 b ensures that the
interaction of ﬁrst-period labor with second-period labor keeps the second-
period production technology concave in ﬁrst-period labor ðsee eq. ½12 be-
lowÞ. With probability 1 2 p, the farmer gets nothing because her seedlings
are destroyed by drought, ﬂoods, or pests. However, she can earnw2F by using
her family labor in the ganyu market.
If the shock is good, the commercial farmer maximizes the following ex-
pression at the beginning of period 2 and decides on the second-period labor
demand, LM2 :
IA LM2
 
bT 12b 2 wH2 L
M
2 ; ð8Þ
yielding a labor demand
LM2 5 T
IAb
wH2
 1= 12bð Þ
: ð9Þ
As in equation ð3Þ, this yields a net income from the commercial crop in pe-
riod 2 of
Y MH 5 12 bð ÞT IAð Þ1= 12bð Þ
b
wH2
 b= 12bð Þ
;
and Y ML 5 0:
ð10Þ
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The period 2 earnings of the commercial farmer thus take on two possible val-
ues: no negative shock gives her Y MH with probability p, and a negative shock
gives her wL2 F with probability 12p.
Corresponding to equation ð4Þ, the second-period income for a commer-
cial farmer is given by
EY M 5 w1 F 2 L
M
1
 
1 p wH2 F 1 Y
M
H
 
1 12 pð Þ wL2F
 
; ð11Þ
where LM2 is given by ð9Þ. As we did for equation ð4Þ, we can write
EY M 5 w1 F 2 LM1
 
1 p wH2 F 1 m
HT Ið Þ1= 12bð Þ 1 12 pð Þ wL2F 
5 w1 F 2 LM1
 
1 p mHT Ið Þ1= 12bð Þ 1 R; ð11Þ
where
mH ; 12 bð Þ Að Þ1= 12bð Þ b
wH2
 b= 12bð Þ
and
R ; 12 q
 
wL2F
 
1 pwH2 F:
Observe that mH and R are both independent of LM1 . The difference from
the staple production is that now the farmer must also nontrivially decide on
the amount of period 1 labor to use on each unit of land. For the staple crop,
this was given by technology; for the commercial farmer, this is an endogenous
choice. In other words, the commercial farmer will choose LM1 to maximize the
right-hand side of equation ð11Þ ðor eq. ½11*Þ, which is the same thing as
maximizing w1 F 2 LM1
 
1 p mHT Ið Þ1= 12bð Þ . Substituting equation ð6Þ into
this expression, the solution for the ﬁrst-period labor demand for commercial
production is given by
LM1 5 Q Tð Þ 22bð Þ= 12b2gð Þ;
where Q ;
g= 12 bð Þ½  pmHð Þ að Þ1= 12bð Þ
w1
 	 12bð Þ= 12b2gð Þ
:
ð12Þ
Plugging this value of LM1 into the expression being maximized, and re-
calling ð6Þ, we get
w1F 1 p mHT aT LM1
 g 1= 12bð Þn o
2 w1LM1 ;
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which, on simpliﬁcation yields
Z Qð Þg= 12bð Þ 2 w1 Qð Þ 12b2gð Þ= 12bð Þ
 
T 22bð Þ= 12b2gð Þ;
where Z ; pmH a1= 12bð Þ
 
:
ð12Þ
The important thing to note here is that the maximized value of ð11*Þ is
increasing at an increasing rate in T, while ð4*Þ is linear in T. Therefore,
comparing ð4*Þ and ð12*Þ, we know that there exists a value T* of land such
that EY M ≥ EY S if and only if T ≥ T * ≥ 0, or that the larger farmer will opt
for the commercial crop while the smaller farmer will stay with the staple crop.
C. The Aggregated Economy
Any region will have a distribution of farmers distinguished from each other
by the amount of land they hold. Given the productivity of land in the region,
the prices, the wages, and the technology, farmers make their decisions. We are
interested in the impact of the equilibrating farmer decisions on the off-farm
regional labor market.
First, observe that staple-growing farmers with landholding less than F/l S
will have family labor available for the labor market of an amount F2 l ST .
Similarly, from equation ð12Þ, we can get a value of T for the commercial farm-
ers such that all farmers below this amount of landholding will supply labor
in the ﬁrst-period labor market. More formally, for all T less than or equal
to F=Qð Þ 12b2gð Þ= 22bð Þ ðbut greater than T * since otherwise she would be a staple
producerÞ, commercial farmers will be providing labor to the ﬁrst-period labor
market.
LetT S ;min F=l Sð Þ;T *½ , TM ;max F=Qð Þ 12b2gð Þ= 22bð Þ;T * , and GðT Þ
be the distribution of land in the region. Then the ﬁrst-period ganyu supply
from the staple-growing farmers, NS1 , will be given by
NS1 5 ET S
0
F 2 l ST dG Tð Þ;
and the ﬁrst-period ganyu supply from commercial farmers, NM1 , is given by
NM1 5
0 if TM ≤ T *
ETM
T *
F 2 Q Tð Þ 22bð Þ= 12b2gð Þ dG Tð Þ if TM > T *
8<
: :
First-period labor demand by staple growers will similarly be given by
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DS1 5
0 if T S ≥ T *
ET *
F=l S
l ST 2 FdG Tð Þ if T S < T *
8><
>:
and for commercial farmers by
DM1 5 E
T≥TM
Q Tð Þ 22bð Þ= 12b2gð Þ 2 FdG Tð Þ:
The ﬁrst-period labor market will clear when N1 ; NS1 1 N
M
1 5 D
S
1 1
DM1 ; D1. Observe that Q contains the ﬁrst-period-equilibrating w1 that will
ensure that the ﬁrst-period labor market clears since it is immediate that the
supply of labor for both types of farmers is increasing in w1 while their de-
mands for labor are decreasing in w1.
This statement is valid only ifwH2 is correctly anticipated by the farmers. The
only thing that affects the second-period wage is the signal. Thus, all farmers
can successfully predict the wage once they observe the signal, and this pre-
diction will be self-fulﬁlling in equilibrium. Thus, all farmers know what the
second-period market-clearing wage is once they observe the signal.
To see this more clearly, let us calculate the demands and supplies of second-
period labor. Suppose the signal is good ði.e., there is no shockÞ. Then all com-
mercial farmers will demand LM2 as given by equation ð9Þ, which depends only
wH2 and is increasing in T. The aggregate demand for labor by a commercial
farmer is given by LM2 5 T IAb=w
H
2
 1= 12bð Þ
5 TQ ðsee eq. ½9Þ, where Q;
IAb=wH2
 1= 12bð Þ
. Therefore, if TQ ≤ F or T ≤ F=Q and T *< F=Q, farmers
will supply labor in the second period; otherwise theywill demand labor.Hence,
the supplyof second-period labor in themarketbycommercial farmers,NM2 Hð Þ,
with H denoting a positive signal, is given by
NM2 Hð Þ5 E
F=Q
T *
F 2 TQ dG Tð Þ if T *< F=Q
0 otherwise
8<
: :
In equation ð2Þ, we stated the amount of labor used by the staple grower
as a function of the second-period wage. If the correlated shock is good, the
second-period wage is denoted wH2 , and we can write equation ð2Þ as LS2 5
T a=wH2
 1= 12að Þ
5 TFH , where FH ; a=wH2
 1= 12að Þ
. Thus,
NS2 Hð Þ5 EtH
0
F 2 TFH dG Tð Þ;
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where tH5min T *; F=FHð Þ. Observe that both Q and FH are decreasing
functions of the second-period ðhighÞ wage, and hence the two supply curves
are upward sloping, giving a positively sloped aggregate second-period labor sup-
ply when the signal is good.
Correspondingly, the demand for second-period labor by commercial farm-
ers is
DM2 Hð Þ5
E
F=Q
TQ2 FdG Tð Þ if T * < F=Q
E
T *
TQ2 FdG Tð Þ if T * ≥ F=Q
8>><
>>:
and
DS2 Hð Þ5 E
T *
F=FH
TFH 2 FdG Tð Þ if T* ≥ F=FH
0 otherwise
8<
: :
Observe that both demand curves are negatively sloped in wH2 ; hence, as in the
ﬁrst-period labor market, the high-signal wage will equilibrate
N2 Hð Þ; NS2 Hð Þ1 NM2 Hð Þ5 DS2 Hð Þ1 DM2 Hð Þ;D2 Hð Þ:
When the signal about the shock is bad or low, then all commercial farmers
will offer their entire family labor to the market. Then if FL ; a=wL2
 1= 12að Þ
,
then NM2 Lð Þ5 ∫T *F dG Tð Þ and NS2 ðLÞ5 ∫
t L
0 F 2 TF
L dGðT Þ, where tL 5
min T *; F=FLð Þ. While NM2 ðLÞ is invariant with respect to wL2 , the staple
labor supply is increasing in wL2 , once again giving us a positively sloped
second-period supply curve of labor when the signal is bad.
In the low-signal case, there will be no demand for period 2 labor by com-
mercial farmers, and only the staple growers will demand labor. Thus,
DM2 Lð Þ5 0;
and
DS2 Lð Þ5 E
T *
F=FL
TFL 2 F dG Tð Þ if T * ≥ F=FL
0 otherwise
8<
: :
Observe that FL→ ` as wL2 → 0, and, hence, there will always be a positive
second-period low wage at which the market clears ði.e., DS2 Lð Þ > 0Þ.
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Note that the second-period low-wage equilibrium, which happens when
the shock is bad, implies that staple growers, or the small farmers, will demand
more ganyu than the large farmers ðwho demand no labor and supply all their
family labor to the marketÞ. Since family labor is preferred to hired labor, this
means that smaller farmers will be using all their labor on the farm, while
larger farmers will be entering the supply side of the labor market when wages
are low. It is as if the low wage ðbad signal caseÞ squeezes out the smaller farm-
ers from the labor market.
We can summarize the most relevant conclusions from our model as fol-
lows:
1. Overall ganyu supply will increase in the event of a negative shock.
2. This effect is driven by commercial farmers abandoning their produc-
tion and making use of ganyu as their fall-back option. These com-
mercial farmers are those farmers with larger land size.
3. Conversely, small farmers tend to stay with the riskless staple food pro-
duction, so that shocks only indirectly affect their ganyu supply. In
equilibrium they should supply less rather than more ganyu in the event
of a shock.
4. In good states of nature ðno negative shocksÞ, ganyu will be supplied
primarily by poor farmers ðsimply because they need less of their family
labor on their own landÞ, whereas large farmers will demand ganyu.
III. Ganyu Labor in Rural Malawi: Context and Descriptive Statistics
To test the hypotheses of our model in the context of rural Malawi, we
use the Second Integrated Household Survey 2004, available upon request
from the World Bank. Data were collected between March 2004 and March
2005. The survey covers a stratiﬁed random sample of 11,280 households
ðincluding a total of 52,702 individuals, or 0.42% of the Malawi populationÞ,
over the whole area of the country. As ganyu is predominantly a rural phe-
nomenon and occupational decisions by urban households tend to be based
on different considerations ðwith additional options for off-farm labor sup-
plyÞ, we restrict our sample to agricultural households, namely, households en-
gaged in agricultural production during the reference period. These represent
approximately 89% of the sample, the size of which is reduced to 10,032 ob-
servations. After accounting for missing values, we are left with 9,994 observa-
tions for our empirical analysis.
To set the stage, we ﬁrst take a look at the land distribution and cash crop
choices among farmers in rural Malawi. Figure 1A highlights the average land
size across quintiles in the land distribution, while ﬁgure 1B shows the pro-
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portions of different types of crops, produced by farmers belonging to these
quintiles. Taken together, these statistics are consistent with the evidence on
Malawi, presented at the outset of the article, as well as with the dynamics
of the model outlined in Section II. The highly skewed land distribution,
whereby land is concentrated among the top 20% of the farmers while 80%
of the smallholders operate land plots on average not exceeding 2 hectares, is
consistent with the evidence of a continued dualistic agricultural market struc-
Figure 1. A, Average land size ðhectaresÞ per quintile of the land distribution. B, Share of households
producing different crops, by quintile of the land size distribution; quintile 1 represents the smallest plot
area, and quintile 5 the largest plot area. Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the Second Integrated
Household Survey of Malawi.
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ture. Furthermore, the production of barley tobacco, groundnuts, and cotton,
the key cash crops in Malawi, is much more prevalent among the largest farm-
ers belonging to quintile 5 than among the small households in quintile 1
and increases relatively steadily in between. Hence, without loss of general-
ity, and in keeping with our theoretical model, we conduct our empirical esti-
mations separately for the samples of “large” farmers, belonging to quintile 5,
and “small” farmers, belonging to quintiles 1–4.1
To further verify the realism of the model’s assumptions in the context of
Malawi, we take a look at the probability of demand and supply of ganyu la-
bor—captured by the proportions of farmers supplying and demanding
ganyu—separately for large farmers ðbelonging to quintile 5 of the land size
distributionÞ and small farmers ðbelonging to quintiles 1–4 of the land size
distributionÞ in the event of a shock and in the event of no shock ðsee ﬁg. 2Þ.
Shocks related to droughts, ﬂoods, or crop diseases, that is, the types of shocks
that are key to our analysis, are referred to as “village shocks” since they are
correlated across households. The diagram also highlights the average regional
wages for the different states of nature.
Once again, the statistics are consistent with the logic of our model. We
observe that the model’s dynamics is indeed driven by the behavior of large
farmers who appear to enter the market on the supply side and exit the market
on the demand side in the event of shock compared to the state of no shock,
while the probability of either entering or exiting the ganyu market remains
roughly unchanged for small farmers. The statistics are also consistent with
the model in that under “normal conditions” the supply side of the market is
dominated by smallholders while large farmers are more likely to demand
ganyu labor, as well as with the fact that while smallholders “belong” to the
market, the shock-based dynamics is driven by large farmers whose probabil-
ity to enter on the supply side and probability to exit on the demand side in-
creases. While these statistics reﬂect probabilities, a further look at the data
indicates that the average days of labor supplied by smallholders decreases in
the event of a correlated shock, especially one characterized by pests and crop
diseases, consistent with the general equilibrium dynamics of the model. Fi-
nally, the general equilibrium dynamics is conﬁrmed by the 10% lower re-
gional wage in the event of a correlated shock compared to the situation of
no shock.
1 We also performed estimations separately for all ﬁve quintiles. These results, available upon request,
are consistent with our model and overall story. Given the better ﬁt of our estimates for two sets of
farmers—large and small—with the model, we prefer to keep only these results in the article.
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Since our main empirical focus is on ganyu labor, we are interested in iden-
tifying key covariates of ganyu labor over and above the village shocks. Table 1
highlights the prevalence of ganyu in Malawi and shows the characteristics of
the households participating in the ganyu labor market. The ﬁrst row shows
that ganyu is a wide-spread phenomenon. During the year of the survey, more
than half of the rural households inMalawi ð44%1 9%Þ supplied some ganyu,
and about one-quarter ð16% 1 9%Þ recruited ganyu. A noticeable 9% of the
households even engage in both supply and demand of ganyu, which is also
consistent with our model.
The following rows in table 1 provide some information on the well-being
of households, household structure, as well as land and production character-
istics. While poverty is widely spread across all groups, on average, ganyu-
recruiting households are signiﬁcantly better off than ganyu-supplying house-
holds.
Table 1 further shows that on average, ganyu-supplying households are
slightly smaller, much more often headed by females ðwhich may be another,
more indirect indicator of destitution; see Green and Baden 1994; Devereux
1999; Bryceson 2006Þ, and considerably less educated than ganyu-recruiting
households. As expected, they tend to own smaller plots and grow cash crops less
frequently.
Table 1 also shows the share of households that reported the occurrence of
different types of shocks. Aside from the above-mentioned “village shocks,”
we show statistics ðand later control forÞ two idiosyncratic—death/sickness
and theft/damage—shocks, included as a matter of comparison. These shocks
should not inﬂuence the ganyu market as a whole but might still inﬂuence
individual households’ ganyu supply and demand decisions ðmuch like the
Figure 2. Ganyu buying and selling behavior of small and large farmers. Source: Authors’ calculations,
based on the Second Integrated Household Survey of Malawi.
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indicators of poverty or the indicator of household labor resources already
mentioned aboveÞ. In keeping with our model, the group that both demands
and supplies ganyu ðthe one that according to our model is likely to move from
the demand to the supply side of the marketÞ reports the greatest incidence of
shocks, especially those of a correlated nature.
Let us conclude our overview of ganyu in Malawi by looking at the regional
and seasonal spread of the phenomenon. While geographical and seasonal
aspects are not captured by our theoretical framework, they may hide relevant
cultural and production-related factors for which we might need to control in
the following econometric analysis. Figure 3 presents the share of households
involved in hiring ganyu by season and district. As a seasonal differentiation is
not available for supply, we use the hiring data to reﬂect the overall prevalence
of ganyu. Households in urban districts are included if they are engaged in
agricultural activities.2
Figure 3 shows considerable differences in the prevalence of ganyu across
regions. Generally, ganyu is less prevalent in the northern part of Malawi. As
ethnic groups in Malawi are regionally located, these differences may capture
different cultural determinants of ganyu supply. A point in case is the con-
centration of the Ngoni, Ngonde, and Tumbuka ethnicities in the northern
region, who operate under patrilineal kinship systems as opposed to the Chewa
and Yao ethnic groups in the southern and central regions, characterized by a
matrilineal kinship systems ðGreen and Baden 1994Þ. These and other cul-
tural or religious characteristics of different groups may introduce social bar-
riers to ganyu in some cases and a more open attitude in others.
In addition, it is clear that ganyu is much more relevant in the rainy than in
the dry season. This may be related to a stronger need of workers during the
rainy season but also to the fact that the end of the rainy season ðJanuary to
MarchÞ corresponds to the period of greatest difﬁculty to meet consumption
needs. The main harvest takes place during the dry season ðMarch to OctoberÞ
and generally ensures at least a minimum level of consumption. As far as the
possibility to produce during the dry season is related to geographical factors,
this may also explain some of the regional differences discussed above. Overall,
the descriptive statistics are consistent with both the theoretical model and our
understanding of the characteristics of ganyu labor in Malawi.
IV. Empirical Specification
To recapitulate, we distinguish between hypotheses related to ðAÞ times of
shock and ðBÞ normal times, that is, once the event of negative shocks is con-
trolled for:
2 Agricultural but “urban” households constitute 6.3% of the households in our sample.
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A. Hypotheses related to times of shock
H1. Ganyu supply will rise in the event of correlated shocks.
H2. This effect is driven by the effect of the shock on large farmers.
H3. Small farmers will be indirectly affected and tend to reduce their
ganyu supply.
B. Hypothesis related to normal times
H4. In normal times, ganyu is supplied primarily by small farmers. To
test these hypotheses, we perform the empirical analysis ﬁrst for the
full sample, focusing on the characteristics of ganyu in general and
on whether ganyu is primarily supplied by small farmers ðhypoth-
esis BÞ, and then separately for small and large farmers ðhypoth-
eses AÞ.
We proxy our dependent variable with the total number of days of ganyu
labor supplied by each household during the reference year. Our measure of
correlated shocks is based on the household’s positive response to a question
related to the incidence of droughts, ﬂood, or crop pests, which, we assume, will
affect numerous households in a given village at the same time. This correlated
nature of the shock is important in the context of our theoretical model because
idiosyncratic shocks—while potentially severe for any individual household—
should not have signiﬁcant repercussions for the labor market as a whole.
In order to show this contrast within our empirical model, we introduce
idiosyncratic ðhousehold levelÞ shocks as control variables, notably a dummy
variable for household personal shocks due to accidents, illness, or death of
working-age members of the household and another dummy variable for
household property shocks due to damage or theft, including theft of livestock.
To test our hypotheses on the effect of shocks on large relative to small farmers
in our initial full sample analysis, we introduce a “small plot” variable, indi-
cating that a household owns less than 0.5 hectares of land, which makes it
practically landless ðGreen and Baden 1994Þ. In terms of our quintiles, this
critical threshold coincides approximately with the cutoff between quintile 1
and quintile 2.
Apart from these main variables capturing the central predictions of our
theoretical model, we consider a number of controls, which mainly reﬂect the
farmer’s agricultural productivity, wealth characteristics, and geographic char-
acteristics. While at the individual farmer’s level the model identiﬁes the com-
parison between on-farm productivity and wages as a determinant of ganyu
supply, wages are endogenous to the correlated shock variable, and hence the
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effect of wages is implicitly captured by the dynamics of labor supply in the face
of correlated shocks.
While aside from land size, own-farm productivity is likely to vary with the
use of fertilizer and other inputs to the production function, such variables are
likely to be endogenous. In addition to land size, we thus include only a var-
iable for production during the dry season ðwhich is only possible in certain lo-
cationsÞ. Neither of these two variables is likely to change in the short run.
As an additional determinant of own-farm productivity, we consider human
capital. Two types of measures of human capital have been used in household-
level labor supply equations, namely, either education and age ðor experienceÞ of
the household head or the average levels of education and age ðor experienceÞ of
all household members. Since the human capital characteristics of household
members are typically highly correlated and the measures for the household
head are less likely to be endogenous ðRizov and Swinnen 2004Þ, we give pref-
erence to the former and deﬁne our educational indicator as the years of edu-
cation and the experience indicator as the age of the household head.
Available family labor is proxied with the number of adults age 15–64.
Conversely, children under 15 and elderly people will be considered as de-
pendents whose proportion is used as an indicator for poverty, along with a
dummy variable for a female household head. We also include a dummy for
family homes with an iron roof to reﬂect household wealth.
Finally, we introduce some geographic and cultural controls. Malawi is di-
vided into the three regions: north, center, and south. On the basis of the sta-
tistics presented in ﬁgure 3, we expect ganyu to be much less prevalent in the
north. We thus include a dummy variable for the northern region. In addition,
we include dummy variables for the most important ethnic groups, the Chewa,
mainly in central Malawi, and the Lomwe and Yao in the south ðsee, e.g., CIA
2012; Malawi Government 2014Þ. In multiethnic households, the measure
refers to the household head. These variables are meant to control for different
traditions in different parts of the country that could also affect ganyu supply.
A detailed description of all variables can be found in table A1.
V. Econometric Estimation Strategy and Empirical Results
As the number of days of ganyu, supplied by the household, cannot be smaller
than zero, our dependent variable is censored. For this reason, estimating the
off-farm labor supply function with ordinary least squares would lead to
biased results. Tobit and Heckman selection models are both potentially more
appropriate ðCragg 1971; Heckman 1979Þ. Our theoretical model does not
suggest any structural difference between the decision to ﬁrst enter the ganyu
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labor market and the decision of how much ganyu to supply. At least the
direction of the expected effects should be the same for both decisions. This
suggests the use of a Tobit model. To conﬁrm that this is the case empirically,
we perform likelihood ratio tests to discriminate between the two options.
The chi-square statistics turn out to be well below the critical values, indi-
cating that the decision to enter the ganyu market and the amount of labor
supplied to this activity are ðstatisticallyÞ not two separate decisions. On the
basis of these results, a Tobit model will be estimated. As we are not interested
in the effect of our explanatory variables on a latent concept, such as the “pref-
erence for ganyu supply,” but on the actual days of ganyu labor supplied, we do
not directly present the coefﬁcients of the Tobit equation. Instead, we present
the marginal effects with respect to the expected number of days of ganyu
supply, that is, for any explanatory variable xj with coefﬁcient bj ðWooldridge
2002, 523Þ:
yEðganyu daysjxÞ
yxj
5 F
xb
j
 
bj
5 Prðganyu days > 0jxÞbj:
Before we present the results, a few additional estimation problems need to
be considered. First, our data are drawn from a stratiﬁed random sample, so
that observations within strata may not be fully independent. This could lead
to an underestimation of standard errors and thus an overconﬁdence in our
regression results. Hence, we determine our standard errors through boot-
strapping, which also allows us to take stratiﬁcation into account.
Second, there may be concerns with respect to the possible endogeneity of
some of our variables. As mentioned earlier, endogeneity may also be a prob-
lem with respect to different variables used to capture own-farm productiv-
ity. While, for precisely this reason, we have already been highly selective with
the inclusion of these variables, some concerns may remain. To be sure, we
carry out an endogeneity test for land area, dry season cultivation, and educa-
tion, using the two-step procedure for Tobit models outlined by Wooldridge
ð2002Þ. The instruments used are the regional share of small area farms and
the ethnic background of the household head, respectively. We thereby cover
geographical and cultural factors that should be truly exogenous and that are
highly correlated with our variables of interest. Using these instruments for
the above-mentioned test, we determine that the hypothesis of exogeneity
of our initial variables cannot be rejected at any conventional level of sig-
niﬁcance.
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Table 2 highlights our regression results for the sample as a whole. In re-
gressions 1 and 2, we report the results using all variables related to farm pro-
ductivity, wealth or poverty, household labor resources, and the dummy taking
the value of 1 if the household resides in the northern part of the country.
TABLE 2
DETERMINANTS OF GANYU SUPPLY, FULL SAMPLE
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Shock:
Household personal shock 2.90** 3.05**
ð.03Þ ð.04Þ
Household property shock 1.62 1.73
ð.34Þ ð.23Þ
Village shock .99 1.14
ð.45Þ ð.37Þ
Wealth/poverty:
Small plot 3.80*** 3.78*** 4.09***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Plot size 2.005
ð.51Þ
Iron roof 222.15*** 222.03*** 222.18*** 222.06***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Female household head 2.31 2.66* 2.23 1.87
ð.10Þ ð.08Þ ð.10Þ ð.18Þ
Dependents 4.49* 3.98 4.35* 4.25*
ð.07Þ ð.10Þ ð.10Þ ð.09Þ
Household labor resource:
Adults 9.04*** 8.78*** 9.02*** 8.82***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Productivity:
Dry season cultivation 21.79 22.11* 21.75 21.96*
ð.13Þ ð.05Þ ð.15Þ ð.06Þ
Education 22.34*** 22.35*** 22.33*** 22.48***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Age household head 2.38*** 2.39*** 2.38*** 2.37***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Regional control:
North 216.52*** 216.85*** 216.46*** 219.48***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Chewa 23.78**
ð.01Þ
Lomwe 211.23***
ð.00Þ
Yao 212.99***
ð.00Þ
Wald x2ð9Þ 5 601.08 x2ð9Þ 5 651.52 x2ð12Þ 5 618.78 x2ð15Þ 5 610.35
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Note. Tobit estimated effects on Eðganyu days | ganyu days > 0Þ. Marginal effects or discrete change of
dummy variables from 0 to 1. P-values in parentheses. The stratiﬁed sample structure is taken into account
in the estimation of standard errors using bootstrapping ð200 replicationsÞ. N 5 9,770.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Regression 3 then introduces the shocks, and regression 4 provides a robustness
check with a larger number of regional/cultural controls.
The results based on speciﬁcations 1 and 2 conﬁrm the traditional ﬁnding
that ganyu is primarily a strategy of poorer smallholder households. All pov-
erty and wealth indicators have the expected signs and are generally signiﬁ-
cant. Only the female household head variable shows a less robust effect. The
effect of land size is also consistent with our model-driven expectations: house-
holds with small plots of land tend to supply more ganyu. Only in regression
2, when the indicator variable for small plots is replaced by the continuous
variable for land size, does it lose its signiﬁcance. This suggests that land size
does not enter the ganyu supply function in a linear way but rather in terms of
relevant thresholds.
Farm productivity variables, too, are generally signiﬁcant and show the
expected sign: higher education, greater experience, and the ability to produce
crops across seasons reduce the supply of labor in the ganyu market. More-
over, the coefﬁcient of the variable capturing household labor resources is
positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that, at given levels of all other variables,
large households supply more ganyu. The regional control for northern parts
of the country also shows the expected negative sign. Overall, we ﬁnd support
for hypothesis 4.
The coefﬁcients of all these variables remain largely unaffected when we
introduce the shock variables in regressions 3 and 4, the general impact of
which is also consistent with our expectations. In regression 3, we see that in
keeping with hypothesis 1, when hit by droughts, ﬂoods, or crop disease, the
average household supplies an additional 2.4 days of ganyu ð4.8 days if hit by
two of theseÞ. However, note that the average effect across all households is
insigniﬁcant. This is consistent with our theoretical assumptions on a larger
supply of ganyu in the event of a correlated shock simultaneously with a de-
crease in ganyu supply by smaller farmers.
Household personal shocks have a positive effect on ganyu supply by the
individual agricultural household, although in this case, this cannot be in-
duced by the failure of production but only by a signiﬁcant income effect
leading to a reallocation between leisure and labor ðwhich is outside of our
modelÞ. The effect of household property shocks is less clearly signiﬁcant,
possibly because they tend to be much less severe in nature. We do not expect
these shocks to have a differential effect on smaller and larger farmers, some-
thing that we will verify in the forthcoming separate regressions for these two
sets of farm households.
The addition of further cultural and regional variables shows that the three
largest ethnic groups in Malawi ðwhich are located predominantly in the
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center and the southÞ tend to supply less ganyu than smaller, southern groups
ðthe comparison groupÞ. But the rest of the regression results remains unaf-
fected, so we will not consider these factors in the following analysis.
We now turn to the ðkey to our analysisÞ comparison across different land
sizes to examine whether we ﬁnd the predicted differences between small and
large farmers for the correlated shocks. Table 3 presents separate estimations
for these two sets of households.
These results are consistent with the predictions of our model. Village shocks
that account for droughts, ﬂoods, and crop pests have a negative ðalthough
statistically insigniﬁcantÞ effect on small farmers and the expected positive and
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF GANYU SUPPLY FOR SMALL AND LARGE FARMERS
Small Farmer Large Farmer
Shock:
Household personal shock 4.579 11.43
ð.21Þ ð.14Þ
Household property shock 2.285 2.159
ð.52Þ ð.76Þ
Village shock 21.731 24.83***
ð.60Þ ð.00Þ
Productivity:
Dry season cultivation 2.216 220.16***
ð.94Þ ð.00Þ
Education 24.886*** 25.981***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Age household head 2.816*** 2.829***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Wealth:
Iron roof 255.70*** 255.20***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Household characteristic:
Adults 23.06*** 12.02***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Female household head 5.664 9.502
ð.12Þ ð.18Þ
Dependents 11.51* 5.446
ð.06Þ ð.67Þ
North 240.36*** 249.64***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Wald x2ð11Þ 5 596.86 x2ð11Þ 5 165.36
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
N 7,878 1,892
Note. Tobit estimated effects on Eðganyu days | ganyu days > 0Þ. Marginal
effects or discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. P-values in paren-
theses. The stratiﬁed sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of
standard errors using bootstrapping ð500 replicationsÞ. Constant term not pre-
sented here.
* p < .1.
*** p < .01.
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statistically signiﬁcant effect on large farmers. In line with our theoretical expec-
tations, we do not observe this relationship across land sizes for the idiosyn-
cratic household-level shocks.
Table 4 provides further details on the village-level shock by disaggregating
this shock variable into its two components, that is, shocks related to droughts
or ﬂoods, on the one hand, and shocks related to crop disease or pests, on the
other hand. The estimation shows that it is primarily the event of natural
disasters such as droughts and ﬂoods that drives the results with the combined
TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF GANYU SUPPLY FOR SMALL AND LARGE FARMERS
WITH DISAGGREGATED CORRELATED SHOCKS
Small Farmer Large Farmer
Shock:
Household personal shock 4.273 11.55
ð.28Þ ð.13Þ
Household property shock 2.142 2.347
ð.54Þ ð.70Þ
Village shock 1—crop disease/pests 222.30*** 28.474
ð.00Þ ð.57Þ
Village shock 2—drought or floods 3.165 29.47***
ð.37Þ ð.00Þ
Productivity:
Dry season cultivation .0704 219.60***
ð.98Þ ð.00Þ
Education 24.893*** 25.955***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Age household head 2.821*** 2.843***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Wealth:
Iron roof 255.64*** 254.66***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Household characteristic:
Adults 23.03*** 11.99***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Female household head 5.671* 9.244
ð.07Þ ð.21Þ
Dependents 11.24* 5.960
ð.06Þ ð.67Þ
North 240.59*** 249.63***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Wald x2ð12Þ 5 556.30 x2ð12Þ 5 202.88
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
N 7,878 1,892
Note. Tobit estimated effects on Eðganyu days | ganyu days > 0Þ. Marginal
effects or discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1. P-values in paren-
theses. The stratiﬁed sample structure is taken into account in the estimation of
standard errors ðusing the Huber-White sandwich estimator for probit and
bootstrapping ½500 replications for TobitÞ. Constant term not presented here.
* p < .1.
*** p < .01.
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village shock presented before. For this subcategory of the village-level shock,
we ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcantly positive effect on ganyu supply among larger
farmers. The effect is also quantitatively substantial, with the experience of
such a shock being associated, on average, with about 29 days of additional
ganyu labor. By contrast, we obtain the expected negative and signiﬁcant co-
efﬁcient of the crop disease shock for small farmers. The results based on the
shock disaggregation thus grant support to hypotheses 2 and 3, even though the
effects are signiﬁcant only for small farmers in the case of crop disease and
for large farmers in the case of droughts or ﬂoods.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The occupational portfolio choice of small farmers in uncertainty ridden rural
environments is among the most interesting and high proﬁle areas of research
and policy debate in development economics. The largest proportion of
studies in this area has traditionally focused on the choice between relatively
risk-free—though low return—activities such as subsistence farming and
higher-return and higher-risk activities like livestock and cash crop production
and agreed that relatively asset-poor and risk-averse households are likely to
opt for the latter, thus potentially going down the slope of further destitution.
By contrast, the literature on consumption smoothing via off-farm labor
supply has focused on the ability of the market to absorb excess labor in the
event of idiosyncratic production shocks, as well as on distributional issues
linked to asset-based entry barriers for poor farmers in this market. This has
left out of focus the intriguing case of labor market dynamics in the face of
correlated shocks, as well as the interesting from a policy point of view situ-
ation of poverty exacerbation even when obvious entry barriers to factor
markets are not present.
We contribute to the literature by bringing these two stylized paradigms
together in a uniﬁed theoretical framework and exploring the general equi-
librium dynamics of demand and supply of off-farm labor by relatively asset-
poor and relatively asset-rich households in the face of correlated shocks. We
observe that while in keeping with stylized theoretical assumptions asset-rich
households are in a better ex ante position to opt for larger-return high-value
agricultural activities, the more rewarding ex ante choices increase their ex post
vulnerability to correlated shocks. The increased ex post propensity of large
farmers to decrease labor demand and supply more off-farm labor in the event
of a correlated shock can have potentially large implications for the off-farm
labor market as a whole.
The hypotheses emanating from our theoretical model are supported by
empirical evidence from rural Malawi, which contradicts traditional views of
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off-farm ðganyuÞ labor as a consumption-smoothing activity that either traps
poor farmers into poverty or perpetuates the exploitation of the poor by the
rich. Our model sees ganyu as a rational choice of poorer and richer farmers
alike and as a buffer for both sets of farmers from either genuine destitution or
shorter-term negative shocks. Our conceptual results, backed by evidence
from Malawi, provide at least some grounds for rethinking policy advice. One
implicit message of the microeconomics literature on poverty traps is that the
ðpolitically difﬁcultÞ agenda of wealth redistribution may help pull those who
are permanently destitute on account of insufﬁcient ex ante wealth out of the
trap. Although looking closely into this issue is well beyond the scope of our
article, we do not ﬁnd clear indicators that successful asset reallocation ðeven if
it were possibleÞ would necessarily help resolve the poverty entrapment prob-
lems of contexts such as that of rural Malawi.
More importantly ðand more closely linked to the evidence in this articleÞ,
much of the focus of the off-farm labor literature is on dismantling barriers to
entry in the off-farm market. This may indeed be a viable priority in contexts
where clearly superior and constrained entry niches of the labor market coexist
with less proﬁtable labor market opportunities. However, we do ﬁnd that the
ability of the off-farm labor market to provide successful consumption smooth-
ing and poverty-alleviating occupational alternatives to poor farmers may be lim-
ited even when barriers to entry may not be present. In such conditions, direct
intervention as in the case of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
in India could perhaps be a more viable policy agenda.
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